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Why was the Black Death followed by the decline of serfdom in Western Europe but its' intensification
in Eastern Europe? What explains why involvement in Atlantic trade in the Early Modern period was
positively correlated with economic growth in Britain but negatively correlated in Spain? Why did
frontier expansion in the 19th Century Americas go along with economic growth in the United States
and economic decline in Latin America? Why do natural resource booms seem to stimulate growth
in some countries, but lead to a 'curse' in others, and why does foreign aid sometimes seem to encourage,
other times impede economic growth? In this paper we argue that the response of economies to shocks
or innovations in economic opportunities depends on the nature of institutions. When institutions are
strong, new opportunities or windfalls can have positive effects. But when institutions are weak they
can have negative effects. We present a simple model to illustrate how comparative statics are conditional
on the nature of institutions and show how this perspective helps to unify a large number of historical
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What is the impact of productive natural resources on national income? The
conventional wisdom in US and British economic history is that natural re-
sources are good for prosperity, even crucial (Wright, 1990, Wrigley, 2004,
Allen, 2008). In fact, the greater natural resources available to Britain and
Western Europe has been argued to be one of the key reasons for their di-
vergence from China in the early modern period (Pomeranz, 2000).
Though compelling, since natural resources seem to raise income in a
mechanical way, this view faces some striking empirical puzzles. The ￿rst
set concerns the ￿ Dutch Disease￿and the impact of natural gas discoveries
on the competitiveness of manufacturing in the Netherlands. The second set
suggests a much more general negative correlation between economic growth
and the importance of natural resources in the economy (Sachs and Warner,
1995). Since then such ￿ndings have expanded into a whole literature on
the ￿ resource curse￿replete with detailed case studies as well as econometric
results. Indeed, Sachs and Warner (2001, p. 828, 837) argue
￿What the studies based on the post-war experience have ar-
gued is that the curse of natural resources is a demonstrable em-
pirical fact, even after controlling for trends in commodity prices.
. . . Almost without exception, the resource-abundant countries
have stagnated in economic growth since the early 1970s, inspir-
ing the term ￿ curse of natural resources.￿Empirical studies have
shown that this curse is a reasonably solid fact.￿
This view is shared by many, for example (Auty, 2001, p. 840) ￿Since
the 1960s, the resource-poor countries have outperformed the resource-rich
countries compared by a considerable margin￿ . How can a resource boom
reduce income? How can it be that resources were a boon for economic
growth in Britain and the United States, but on average are a curse in the
post-War period?
This puzzling situation with respect to natural resources, such as oil, coal
or diamonds, is reproduced in many other areas of economics. Take the
issue of the impact of the availability of ￿ frontier lands￿on economic and
political development in the Americas in the 19th century. Turner (1920)
1posited that the availability of frontier land was a key factor in ￿ American
exceptionalism￿ . Turner, postulating what has become known as the ￿ Frontier
(or Turner) thesis￿argued that the availability of the western frontier had
led to a particular type of person and had crucially determined the path of
US society.
￿The existence of an area of free land, its continuous reces-
sion, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain
American Development.
Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modi￿-
cations, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and
shape them to meet changing conditions.￿Turner (1920, pp. 1-2)
Turner emphasized that the frontier created strong individualism and
social mobility and his most forthright claim is that it was critical to the
development of democracy. He noted
￿the most important e⁄ect of the frontier has been to promote
democracy￿Turner (1920, p. 30)
and
￿These free lands promoted individualism, economic equality,
freedom to rise, democracy ... American democracy is fundamen-
tally the outcome of the experiences of the American people in
dealing with the West.￿Turner (1920, pp. 259, 266)
Moreover, the things that went along with democracy and helped to pro-
mote it, such as social mobility, most likely also stimulated economic perfor-
mance.
Since Turner wrote, the ￿ Frontier Thesis￿has become part of the conven-
tional wisdom amongst historians and scholars of the United States. Though
the speci￿c mechanisms that Turner favored, such as individualism, have be-
come less prominent, arguments about the frontier have appeared in many
places, particularly the literature on the democratization of the United States
(Keyssar, 2000, Engerman and Sokolo⁄, 2005). Keyssar (2000, p. xxi) argues
2￿The expansion of su⁄rage in the United States was gener-
ated by a number of key forces and factors ... These include
the dynamics of frontier settlement (as Frederick Jackson Turner
pointed out a century ago).￿
When Turner talked about ￿ America￿in fact he meant the United States.
Elsewhere in the Americas, the impact of the frontier was rather di⁄erent. In
fact, the existence of a frontier clearly did not distinguish the United States
from the other countries of the Americas or indeed other societies such as
Russia, South Africa or Australia in the 19th century. Every independent
South American and Caribbean country, with the exception of Haiti, had a
frontier in the 19th century. As in the United States, these frontiers were usu-
ally inhabited by indigenous peoples and they went through the same pattern
of expansion into this zone which, as in the United States, coincided with
the expropriation and oftentimes annihilation of indigenous communities.
In Latin America, however, frontier expansion is not associated with
democracy or economic development. The most important book on this
topic concludes that
￿Latin American frontiers have not provided fertile ground
for democracy. The concentration of wealth and the absence of
capital and of highly motivated pioneers e⁄ectively blocked the
growth of independent smallholders and a rural middle class￿
(Hennessy, 1978, p. 129).
How can the frontier be good for democracy and economic growth in the
United States and bad for the same two outcome variables in Latin America?
The search for an unconditional impact of natural resources or the avail-
ability of new land is at some level quite strange. This is because the stan-
dard tools of comparative static analysis rarely make such a clean cut pre-
diction. One of the ￿rst things you learn in microeconomics is that it is
not even possible to say if people will buy less of a good when its price
increases or that workers will work less if their wage falls. Even the most
celebrated comparative static results, such as those of international trade
theory, the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941) and
3the Rybczynski Theorem (Rybczynski, 1955), are conditional in the sense
that both results depend on conditions about factor intensities.
In this paper we argue that the temptation to search for simple uncon-
ditional relations has marred a great deal of research in economics. In fact,
we argue that the natural position would be that the impact of resources or
of frontier land on the economy and polity, is that it is conditional. Con-
ditional on what? In the tradition of the Arrow-Debreu model the con-
ditioning factors would include preferences, factor endowments, production
possibilities and the structure of markets. Such would be the spirit of the
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem.
Yet this traditional approach encounters a large number of empirical prob-
lems. Consider the following: after the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly in
1873 and gold in Johannesburg in 1886 the economy of South Africa boomed
on the basis of its mineral sector. In the ￿rst half of the 20th century the
terms of trade improved and the relative price of gold increased. The gold-
mines were very labor intensive and the government of South Africa created
a whole set of labor market institutions which were speci￿cally designed to
mobilize labor for the mines (van der Horst, 1942, Feinstein, 2005). The
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem applied to a booming relative price of gold in
an economic sector which was clearly very labor intensive implies that the
real wage rate ought to increase. That it did not is clearly indicated by the
data in Wilson (1972) which shows that in fact the real wages of (black) gold
miners fell over this period. Indeed, in 1970 they were 20% lower than they
had been in 1911. How can booming terms of trade reduce real wages in
labor intensive sectors?1
1Of course it is well known that Theorems such as those of Stolper and Samuelson
and Rybczynski are not general. As long ago as 1958 Bhagwati proposed the notion of
￿ immizerizing growth￿where a country could become worse o⁄ when it got a positive
endowment shock because of severe deterioration in the terms of trade. In addition, it
is clear from the Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein Theorem (Debreu, 1974, Mantel, 1974,
Sonnenschein, 1973, 1974) that such simple comparative static results are not robust and
Opp, Sonnenschein and Tombaz (2007) show one can build a non-pathological model where
there is a ￿ Reverse Rybczynski Theorem￿(see also Kemp and Shimomura, 2002).
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to regard such demonstrations as theoretically inter-
esting but probably not relevant empirically (Hildenbrand, 1994). In addition, it seems
unlikely that the forces that generate the Reverse Rybczynski Theorem are what also
cause the types of empirical phenomenon we describe above even though if this theorem
holds then factor growth is immizerizing (Opp, Sonnenschein and Tombaz, 2007, Propo-
4Modern empirical research has stressed that in order to understand com-
parative patterns of economic development it is crucial to consider the in-
stitutional structures of a society. Fundamental has been the research of
Douglass North and his co-authors (North and Thomas, 1973, North, 1982,
North and Weingast, 1989, North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009) and Enger-
man and Sokolo⁄ (1997) which placed institutional change at the heart of
explaining the ￿ Great Divergence￿of the last 250 years. This historical work
has been largely substantiated by econometric work by Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005a,b) and Acemoglu, Cantoni, Johnson and
Robinson (2009, 2011). This econometric work suggests that the preponder-
ance of di⁄erences in incomes between poor and rich countries is explained by
their institutions with little role being played by natural endowments and re-
sources. Our main point in this paper is that institutions not only determine
the level of income or its rate of growth they also determine the comparative
statics of the equilibrium.
This is readily seen by returning to the two examples we started the pa-
per with. Once we bring institutions into the picture they will in￿ uence the
political and economic incentives that a resource boom can have. Though
resource rents might have a direct positive impact on national income, they
may have all sorts of positive or negative indirect e⁄ects. For example, incre-
ments of resource income could lead political power to become more valuable
inducing politicians to engage in socially wasteful clientelism in order to stay
in power (Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006). Another negative channel
is isolated in Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) who show that a resource
boom can intensify rent seeking. Alternatively, if resource rents ￿ ow into
the private sector they may boost the return to productive activity drawing
people out of rent seeking or bolstering the wealth and political power of pro-
ductive individuals which could improve political accountability. Which of
these e⁄ects tends to dominate will depend on institutions. Political institu-
tions will determine the extent to which politicians will be able to use socially
undesirable strategies to stay in power following a resource boom. Economic
sition 5). For one thing many of the negative correlations between resource booms and
economic growth take place in the context of increases in the prices of the resources and
improving terms of trade, which means they cannot be generated by immizerizing growth
type e⁄ects.
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tent to which agents would ￿nd it optimal to become rent seekers following
a resource boom. If one thinks in a simple way of the strength or weak-
ness of institutions (strong political institutions placing more constraints on
politicians making them more accountable to citizens, strong economic insti-
tutions giving greater property rights security and creating better incentives
for productive economic activity) then we could conjecture that in countries
with strong institutions the positive indirect e⁄ects would dominate, while
in countries with weak institutions the opposite might be true.
That this is so in the case of natural resources was ￿rst shown by Mehlum,
Moene and Torvik (2006). They measured the strength of institutions by
constructing an index from ￿ve di⁄erent data series produced by Political
Risk Services: the rule of law, bureaucratic quality, government corruption,
risk of expropriation and a measure of the likelihood that the government
would repudiate contracts. They then examined the impact of nature re-
source abundance on economic growth conditional on this index of institu-
tions. They found that for countries with weak institutions - low values of
the index - resources were a curse, but for countries above a critical value of
the index, resources were a boon.2 Using a measure of mineral abundance,
they ￿nd that for the top 38% of countries ranked according to institutional
quality (including countries such as Chile, Botswana and Malaysia) resource
abundance stimulates growth, while for the bottom 62% of countries (includ-
ing countries such as Cameroon, Venezuela and Mexico) resource abundance
retards growth.3
We can apply exactly the same set of ideas to thinking about the impact
of the frontier. Indeed Hennessy (1978, p. 13) reasoned
￿If the importance of the Turner thesis lies in its ... ability to
provide a legitimating and fructifying nationalist ideology, then
the absence of a Latin American frontier myth is easy to explain.
2Recent work has begun to investigate other types of political institutions. Andersen
and Aslaksen (2008) ￿nds that the resource curse is present in countries with presidential-
ism, but not in countries with parliamentarism. A likely explanation for this result is that
except for the US presidential system, in most presidential system there are few checks
and balances that constrain the executive (see Robinson and Torvik, 2008, on this issue).
3Instrumenting for institutional quality, Boschini, Pettersson and Roine (2007) ￿nd
similar results.
6Without democracy, there was no compulsion to elaborate a sup-
portive ideology based on frontier experiences.￿
Garc￿a-Jimeno and Robinson (2011) show that the impact of frontier land
is conditional on the strength of institutions. Just as with resource booms, it
is clear why this might be so. This is because frontier lands have to be allo-
cated by the political system. In the United States legislation dating back to
the Land Ordinance of 1785 right through to the 1862 Homestead Act created
a very egalitarian allocation of land. The situation in Latin America outside
of Costa Rica and Colombia was very di⁄erent. There oligarchic or author-
itarian political systems created very inegalitarian frontiers thus locking in
their power. To capture this Garc￿a-Jimeno and Robinson (2011) construct
estimates of the proportion of land that was frontier for all countries of the
Americas in 1850 and show that the long-run impact of this on economic
and political development is conditional on initial institutions, speci￿cally
constraints on the executive in 1850. With respect to economic development
they show that for countries with the lowest level of constraints on the execu-
tive in 1850 there is a negative correlation between the extent of frontier and
GDP per-capita today, while for countries with greater constraints in 1850
there is a positive correlation. They propose a Conditional Frontier Thesis
such that if institutions are strong an open frontier is good for economic
development but if they are weak it is bad for economic development.
In this paper we develop the simple idea that the comparative statics
of an equilibrium are often conditional on the institutional equilibrium of a
society, a phenomenon we call institutional comparative statics. We develop
a simple model which illustrates these ideas.
Though our model is not the right one to address the South African
paradox stated above the right explanation is very much in the spirit of our
results because it was the initial institutional equilibrium which determined
the outcome. This equilibrium featured the political dominance of the white
20% of the population over the rest and economic institutions designed to
extract rents from blacks to enrich the whites. When the price of gold goes
up this creates a greater incentive for whites to exploit blacks, thus driving
down the wage.
A large literature in political economy and development has of course em-
7phasized the importance of the institutional environment for thinking about
di⁄erences in income levels, development paths and public policy outcomes.
There is a now a great deal of theoretical work which suggests that the struc-
ture of political institutions, for instance the capacity of the state, nature of
the constitution and the electoral system in￿ uences public policy. The e⁄ects
include the extent to which public goods are provided, the amount of rent
extraction or corruption by politicians and the ability of politicians (see for
instance Persson and Tabellini, 2000, 2003, Besley, 2006, Besley and Pers-
son, 2011). For instance, comparing a situation with and without checks and
balances one would expect politicians to extract more rents when checks and
balances are absent (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 1997). Alternatively,
considering a situation where politicians have re-election incentives to one
where they do not, one would expect politicians to extract less rents when
they face re-election (Barro, 1973, Ferejohn, 1986, Ferraz and Finan, 2008).
Empirically, research has argued that di⁄erences in economic institutions
such as the security of property rights are the main determinant of cross-
country income di⁄erences (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2002).
In turn this work sees economic institutions themselves as the outcome of a
political process and therefore connected to the nature of political institu-
tions and the distribution of political power in society (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, 2005b, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2011).
Our main contribution to this literature is to emphasize that institutional
quality or ￿ strength￿in￿ uences the way that the political economy equilib-
rium will respond to shocks and changes in the economic environment. This
point is, we believe, important but not widely understood. For instance,
though development problems are often blamed on poor institutions, pol-
icy advice is independent of the institutional environment. Consider Africa.
Nearly every economist regards the poverty of Africa as being closely related
to institutional problems. Yet they continue to make policy prescriptions
which ignore this, for instance discussing the bene￿ts of allowing African
countries to export more freely to OECD countries without considering how
the initially poor institutions determine the consequences of export booms.
We think history and a great deal of cross-national evidence shows that
the consequences of changes in economic opportunities or the environment
8is conditional on the institutions of a country. This implies that there is
no necessity that opening markets to exports from Africa would stimulate
economic growth in Africa.
The model and this way of thinking about the evidence allows us to make
sense of a lot of di⁄erent empirical and historical research. Though our sim-
ple model has no aspiration to generality we believe that the approach we
outline is a powerful one. We should stop hoping for unconditional compar-
ative static results and think about how institutions condition the impact of
perturbations of an equilibrium.
Our paper builds on many historical and empirical studies but also on
a few papers in the literature on the resource curse, particularly Mehlum,
Moene and Torvik (2006) and Robinson, Torvik and Verdier (2006). Our
model in this paper builds on these papers as well as Torvik (2002). Our
approach is also related to models of the allocation of talent by Murphy,
Vishny and Shleifer (1991), Acemoglu (1995), Baland and Francois (2000)
and Dal B￿ and Dal B￿ (2006). Our main results are also related to Lane and
Tornell (1999) who show how a windfall can reduce growth via the incentives
it creates for interests groups to intensify their lobbying. The mechanism in
our paper is completely di⁄erent to the one they study. Our paper shares a
similar spirit to Conning (2004) and Acemoglu and Wolitzky (2011). Both
papers propose models to throw light on Domer￿ s (1970) analysis of labor
coercion and study the conditions under which free labor or slavery can
appear. In neither case do the comparative statics hinge on institutions as
they do in our paper.
In Section 2 we develop our model to study how new economic opportu-
nities map into aggregate income, and show that this mapping is conditional
on the quality of institutions in place. In Section 3 we review other relevant
historical evidence on how similar improvements in economic opportunities
generated very di⁄erent outcomes in di⁄erent countries. Section 4 concludes.
92 A simple model of economic opportunities
and economic outcomes
We aim to develop a simple and fairly reduced form approach that can shed
light on di⁄erent historical episodes and empirical results. Still, a common
characteristic is that we study how new economic opportunities a⁄ect aggre-
gate income. The new economic opportunities may be new possibilities for
trade, new available land, new technology, the discovery of valuable timber,
oil or minerals. In the model we simply refer to these as natural resources.
The utilization of these new opportunities depends on the strength of
institutions in place, and they do so because these a⁄ect the incentives of
entrepreneurs. We assume throughout that entrepreneurs may engage in one
out of two activities. We term these two activities production and ￿ politics￿
and to make things very simple we initially abstract from the possibility that
politicians can undertake any socially productive action - such as provide
public goods. By producers we will understand those entrepreneurs that use
their labor and talent in a standard fashion to convert factors into output.
By ￿ political entrepreneurs￿we will understand those entrepreneurs that use
the political system in various ways so as to redistribute income and property
rights towards themselves.4 A common characteristic of such activities is that
the political entrepreneurs earn income partly by decreasing the income of
entrepreneurs engaged in production.
When institutions allow ￿ politicians￿and those engaged in political activi-
ties to extract rents then increased opportunities are likely to expand the part
of the economy that with the help of political power transfers income and
property rights to itself. For productive entrepreneurs, and for society, this is
costly. On the other hand, when institutions provide secure property rights
4The most obvious way is for those that have political power to use this to enrich
themselves by taxation and expropriation, but the model may also be interpreted in several
other ways. For instance when entrepreneurs bene￿t by using their talent to lobby for
targeted subsidies which is bene￿cial for themselves but costly for rest of society. Or they
lobby for regulations that yield monopoly rents, or when they block technological process
so as to keep old privileges, or when they extort productive enterprises, or when they grab
other agents￿property or output, or when they initiate civil con￿ ict with the motivation
of getting access to natural resources, and so on. In general the quality of institutions may
be understood as how constrained entrepreneurs are in undertaking such rent extracting
activities.
10to a broader segment of society increased economic opportunities are likely to
strengthen commercial interests outside the political elite and make politics
less attractive as a profession. This is favorable to entrepreneurs undertaking
production not only because they are able to utilize new economic opportuni-
ties, but also because the relative position of the rent extracting political class
becomes weaker. In the model when institutions place strong constraints on
politicians entrepreneurs are incentivized to choose economically productive
activities, while when political institutions place few constraints on politi-
cians then entrepreneurs will be incentivized to use the political system to
transfer income and property rights to themselves. We then investigate how
the e⁄ect of new economic opportunities are conditional on institutions.
Our interpretation of the most important institutions being the ones that
constrain politicians comes from our reading of both the literature on the re-
source curse and frontier expansion. For example, Garc￿a-Jimeno and Robin-
son (2011) speci￿cally use constraints on the executive to measure institu-
tional strength, directly analogous to our model and the historical evidence
suggests it was precisely the ability of political elites to determine the allo-
cation of frontier lands that determined its impact. Similarly, the index of
institutional constraints used by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) is dom-
inated by public sector outcome variables, such as corruption, which would
ultimately be determined by the extent of constraints on politicians.
A traditional approach to investigate the e⁄ect of natural resources is
to postulate some macro production function that describes how factor en-
dowments map into aggregate income. In such an approach the e⁄ect of
factor endowments follows from the assumptions captured by the production
function. If the mapping from resources to aggregate income is weak, some
exogenous parameters in the production function (such as technology) are to
blame.
Although the marginal productivity of natural resources is key to un-
derstand the link between resource endowments and aggregate income, it
does not tell the full story because there is limited scope for investigating
how incentives to utilize the resources may be conditional on institutions.
The marginal productivity of natural resources may be thought of as the
impact e⁄ect of an increase in the factor endowments. Then, if there are no
11additional e⁄ects the ￿nal e⁄ect coincides with the impact e⁄ect. In most
instances, however, we would argue that such an understanding of the map-
ping from factor endowments to aggregate income is rather limited and often
incorrect. We illustrate this with our simple model, where the aggregate ef-
fect of natural resources depends on the marginal productivity of resources
interacted with the type of political institutions in place. We show that when
institutions place strong constraints on the political elite the aggregate in-
come e⁄ect is stronger than the impact e⁄ect. Even with full employment
and no price rigidities we get a multiplier e⁄ect of resource endowments which
resembles the one in the simplest closed economy Keynesian model, although
for a very di⁄erent reason.
When institutions do not place strong constraints on politicians an in-
crease in the natural resource endowment also induces a multiplier e⁄ect -
but the bad news is that in this case the multiplier has a negative sign. As a
result, when institutions allow political entrepreneurs to extract rents the in-
direct negative e⁄ects of resource endowments are stronger than the positive
impact e⁄ect, and aggregate income falls. Thus in our model the compara-
tive statics of resource endowments in general, and the sign of the e⁄ect in
particular, are conditional on the strength of institutions.
2.1 Factor endowments and technology
We assume a continuous mass of entrepreneurs normalized to size one, and
denote by l the share of entrepreneurs in private production, where the re-
maining share 1 ￿ l of entrepreneurs engage in politics. The endowment of
natural resources in the economy is denoted by r. The distribution of these
between the private and political entrepreneurs depends on the strength of
institutions. In countries with strong constraints on politicians the ability of
politicians to use their position so as to transfer property rights to resources
to themselves are more limited than in countries with weak constraints. Here
we model this in the very simplest way. Let the institutional strength be given
by ￿ 2 [0;1]. The stronger are institutions, the more constraints they place
on politicians, the higher is ￿. These constraints have the e⁄ect of reducing
the ability of politicians to transfer property rights to themselves. Thus if
institutions make it impossible for the political elite to transfer the property
12rights to themselves we have the strongest checks possible, and we denote
this by ￿ = 1. The converse case, where politicians are not constrained at
all, we denote by ￿ = 0. For cases in between ￿ 2 (0;1).
Denote by rp the amount of natural resources available to each entre-
















￿(￿;l) denotes the derivative of rp(￿;l) with respect to ￿ and so
on. Thus the more constraints on political power, the less of the natural
resources are appropriated by each political entrepreneur and the more is










where r is the total amount of resources available.




where fl(l;rp); fr(l;rp) > 0. More entrepreneurs in production means less
entrepreneurs engaged in political rent extraction, which is favorable to each
entrepreneur in production. More natural resources available to an entrepre-
neur in production increases his production and income.




where gl(l;re); gr(l;re) > 0. More entrepreneurs in the productive sector
mean fewer political entrepreneurs to compete with and more productive en-
trepreneurs to transfer income from, which increases income for each politi-
cian. More natural resources available to each political entrepreneur increases
the income of political rent extraction.5
Aggregate and per capita income in the economy is given by
Y = ly + (1 ￿ l)x: (3)
5Through a⁄ecting the property rights to natural resources institutional quality has a
132.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is de￿ned as a situation where no entrepre-
neur has an incentive to switch activity. We assume the following assumption
to be ful￿lled:
Assumption 1: f(0;rp) > g(0;re) and f(1;rp) < g(1;re).
This assumption assumes that there is no specialization. The ￿rst of these
inequalities implies that the income of a political entrepreneur is lower than
the income of a producer if there are no producers, as then there are many
political entrepreneurs to compete with but no producers to transfer income
from. This is immediate from our assumptions about the allocation of natural
resources since with ￿ and r exogenous as l goes to zero the per-capita amount
of resources becomes unboundedly large as long as ￿ < 1. What Assumption
1 thus add is just that also when ￿ = 1 there is no specialization.
The second inequality implies that the income of a producer is lower than
the income of a political entrepreneur if there are no political entrepreneurs,
since then there are many producers to transfer income from and no political
entrepreneurs to compete with. The second inequality Assumption 1 will
always be ful￿lled for ￿ > 0 as again with our particular speci￿cation of
how resources are allocated f(1;rp) < g(1;re) is implied by the per-capita
resource allocations. The second inequality in Assumption 1 just says that
the no specialization case also holds for ￿ = 0.
Thus Assumption 1 implies that in any situation with specialization, some
entrepreneurs have an incentive to switch activity, and specialization thus can
not constitute an equilibrium.6
An implication from Assumption 1 is therefore that any equilibrium has
a strictly positive number of political entrepreneurs and producers. The
condition for equilibrium is simply:
y = x: (4)
partial negative in￿ uence on income for productive entrepreneurs and a positive e⁄ect on
income for entrepreneurs in political rent extraction. Obviously, institutions may in addi-
tion have negative impact on production and positive impact on rent extraction through
additional channels. Adding on such e⁄ects would strengthen our qualitative conclusions.
6For a model on how natural resources a⁄ect income when there is also the possibility
of specialization see Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006).
14Also, note that (4) in combination with (3) implies that aggregate income in
any equilibrium is simply given by
Y = y = x: (5)
We de￿ne a locally stable equilibrium as:








(1 ￿ l)2r: (6)
To see why this is locally stable, assume that we start out with y =
x and then that for some reason l increases marginally. Then income for
each entrepreneur in production increases by fl(l;rp)￿fr(l;rp) ￿
l2r. The ￿rst
term here is just the direct e⁄ect of output while the second (negative) term
comes from the fact that when the number of producers goes up the per-
capita endowment of resources in the production sector goes down. The
income for each political entrepreneur changes by gl(l;re) + gr(l;re)
(1￿￿)
(1￿l)2r
where the second (positive) term captures the fact that when the number of
productive sector agents goes up the per-capita resource endowment of those
left in politics goes up making politics even more attractive. When (6) holds
the income increases more for political entrepreneurs than for producers,
which means that the number of producers falls and the number of political
entrepreneurs increases until we are back at the initial situation where y = x.
We conversely de￿ne an unstable equilibrium as








(1 ￿ l)2r: (7)
When (7) holds a marginal increase in l from a situation with y = x
implies that the income of producers have become higher than the income of
political entrepreneurs, and thus the initial movement out of equilibrium has
a positive feedback on itself, increasing the number of producers even more,
lowering the number of political entrepreneurs even more, and so on.
Assumption 1 implies that there always exists at least one stable equi-
librium. There may not exist unstable equilibria. If there exists unstable
equilibria, the number of stable equilibria always exceeds the number of un-
stable equilibria by one.
Moreover to study the most interesting case which is in line with our
motivation above we assume the following:
15Assumption 2: fl(l;rp) ￿ fr(l;rp) ￿
l2r > 0 (in equilibrium).
This assumption says that other things equal less political entrepreneurs
in rent extraction is good for entrepreneurs in production. Less entrepreneurs
in rent extraction has two e⁄ects on the income of a productive entrepreneur.
The direct e⁄ect of less entrepreneurs engaged in political rent extraction is
favorable for producers and is captured by the term fl(l;rp). An indirect
e⁄ect is also operating, however, since less entrepreneurs in rent extraction
means more productive entrepreneurs in production and thus for a given ￿
less natural resources available to each of them. Assumption 2 thus simply
says that (in equilibrium) the direct e⁄ect dominates.7
In Figure 1 we see the case of a unique stable equilibrium. The number
of entrepreneurs engaged in production is measured from left to right on the
horizontal axis, while the entrepreneurs in politics is measured from right
to left. The income of an entrepreneur is measured on the vertical axis.
Aggregate income is simply given by the vertical distance from the horizontal
axis to the intersection of the f(l;rp) and g(l;re) curves (due to the number
of entrepreneurs being normalized to unity).
Figure 2 shows a case with two locally stable and one locally unstable
equilibria. All our comparative statics results will be valid around any stable
equilibrium.
2.3 Institutions and aggregate income
It is already clear that improved institutions has the partial e⁄ect of increas-
ing income for an entrepreneur in production and decreasing income for a
political entrepreneur. To ￿nd the general equilibrium e⁄ect of improved
institutions we substitute from (1) and (2) in (4), and then by di⁄erentiating
we ￿nd the e⁄ect on the allocation of entrepreneurs to be
dl =
fr(l;rp)r




(1￿l)2r ￿ fl(l;rp) + fr(l;rp) ￿
l2r
d￿: (8)
Recall that the due to (6) the denominator is positive, and also recall that
re
￿ < 0. Thus, institutions with stronger constraints on politicians increase
7Note however that all the analytics of the model to follow is valid also in the case
where Assumption 2 does not hold. We discuss the results when Assumption 2 does not
hold below.
16the number of productive entrepreneurs and decrease the number of political
entrepreneurs.
To economize on notation we in the following use fr instead of fr(l;rp)









Note that in light of Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, c(￿) 2 (0;1).



































Then by (5) the e⁄ect on aggregate income from institutions that place























since all terms on the right hand side are positive. Institutions that place
stronger constraints on political entrepreneurs increase aggregate income,
and this increase is magni￿ed by a multiplier e⁄ect. More constraints on
politicians mean that entrepreneurs are incentivized to shift from political
rent extraction to production. In turn, the lower number of entrepreneurs in
political rent extraction and the higher number of entrepreneurs in produc-
tion increases the payo⁄ in production further, making even more entrepre-
neurs shift from rent extraction to production, explaining why the increase
in income is higher than the partial e⁄ect of institutions on the income of
productive entrepreneurs.8
8Also note that if Assumption 2 does not hold then the e⁄ect of institutions is still
positive, but since in this case c(￿) is less than zero we do not have a multiplier e⁄ect, and
the income inducing e⁄ects of strong institutions are thus weaker.
172.4 Institutional Comparative Statics
We have already seen that institutions that place constraints on politicians
have a strong e⁄ect on aggregate income - thus countries with such insti-
tutions are likely to have a much higher income level than countries where
institutions do not place constraints on politicians. We now investigate how
countries with di⁄erent institutions respond to a new discovery of natural
resources. As we will see, the e⁄ect of a discovery of new natural resources
is conditional on the institutions in place. With strong constraints on politi-
cians new economic opportunities map into higher aggregate income, with
weak constraints on politicians new economic opportunities map into lower
aggregate income. Thus initial di⁄erences due to institutional quality are
magni￿ed with new economic possibilities - the same economic possibilities
across countries lead to further divergence in income levels. Moreover, com-
pared to traditional approaches where the e⁄ect of natural resources is simply
given by the marginal productivity of resources, the present simple setting
di⁄ers in that with strong institutions we get a more optimistic picture while
with weak institutions we get a more pessimistic picture.
To illustrate this in a simple and intuitive way we start out with the cases
of ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0, before we turn to a more general case where ￿ 2 (0;1).
2.4.1 Institutions with strong political constraints
When an increased amount of natural resources r is channeled into the pro-







Inserting from (1) and (2) in (4), by di⁄erentiating we ￿nd the e⁄ect on
the allocation of entrepreneurs to be
dlj￿=1 =
fr












































Thus we see that with strong constraints on politicians the e⁄ect of an
increased amount of natural resources is stronger than the isolated e⁄ect
through the marginal productivity. The reason for this is that when in-
stitutions are strong an increase in resource endowments initially increases
pro￿tability among productive entrepreneurs in the economy, but not for
entrepreneurs engaged in political rent extraction. As a result natural re-
sources crowds more entrepreneurs into the productive sector and out of
political rent extraction. In turn, the weakening of political entrepreneurs
means that income in the productive sector increases not only as a result of
more natural resources, but also as a result of less political rent extraction.
This attracts even more entrepreneurs into the productive sector, and so on.
Thus, although we have full employment, institutions with strong constraints
on politicians ensure that resource endowments induce a multiplier e⁄ect.9
We see from the de￿nition of c(￿) that the multiplier is higher the higher is
the income e⁄ect of productive entrepreneurs in production fl relative to the
e⁄ect on the income of political entrepreneurs gl. The intuition for this is
that in such a case as a large reallocation of entrepreneurs from the politi-
cal to the productive part of the economy takes place, in turn making the
increase in income strong.
This result can also be given a graphical representation. In Figure 3 the
income curves for producers and political entrepreneurs are depicted. With
￿ = 1 an increased amount of natural resources shifts the income curve for
producers up with the distance fr=l which represents the impact e⁄ect. We
see that the new equilibrium is at a higher level than the increase represented
by the impact e⁄ect, which is the result of the allocation of entrepreneurs
induced multiplier.10
9The reason this process in not unstable is that the income of production increases less
than the income of rent-seeking when l increases, and thus at some point at a higher level
of income than the one represented by the impact e⁄ect the arbitrage condition y = x is
again ful￿lled.
10Again, note that if Assumption 2 does not hold then the e⁄ect on income is still
19We have seen that, conditional on institutions placing strong constraints
on politicians, the income e⁄ect of resources in the present model is stronger
than what an analysis based solely on the marginal productivity of resources
would suggest. The general equilibrium e⁄ect is not captured simply by
adding up the microeconomic income e⁄ects of more natural resources.
2.4.2 Institutions without political constraints
When ￿ = 0 a new discovery of natural resources bene￿ts politicians as each






Again, inserting from (1) and (2) in (4), by di⁄erentiating we ￿nd the





















































Thus, maybe surprisingly, when institutions do not place constraints on
politicians more natural resources imply not higher but lower aggregate in-
come. The intuition for this result is as follows. When there is more nat-
ural resources the impact e⁄ect is that the income of political entrepreneurs
positive, but since in this case c(￿) is less than zero we do not have a multiplier e⁄ect, and
the e⁄ect in income is less than fr=l. This can also easily be seen graphically since in this
case the curve for entrepreneurs in production is downward sloping.
20increases. The impact e⁄ect pulls in the direction of increased aggregate
income. However, there is an additional multiplier e⁄ect which has the op-
posite sign: as a result of political rent extraction becoming relatively more
pro￿table, entrepreneurs shift from production to politics. As a result, after
the initial increase in income due to the impact e⁄ect, (average) income per
political entrepreneur starts falling. Consider the case where the income in
political rent extraction has fallen back to its initial value. Would this be
su¢ cient to stop the out￿ ow of entrepreneurs from production? The answer
to this question is no, and the reason is that since at this point we have
less productive entrepreneurs and more political entrepreneurs, income for
productive entrepreneurs is lower than it was initially. Thus at this point the
relative income in political entrepreneurship is still higher than in produc-
tive entrepreneurship, and even more entrepreneurs ￿ ow out of production
and into politics. It follows that aggregate income must have fallen: each
productive entrepreneur has the same amount of natural resources as before,
but the political entrepreneurs are stronger than before, and thus income for
each productive entrepreneur must be lower than initially. Since the income
of each political entrepreneur in the new equilibrium is the same as the in-
come of a productive entrepreneur, also income for each political entrepreneur
must have fallen. Thus aggregate income is lower.
Again we have a multiplier e⁄ect, but when there are no constraints on
political behavior the multiplier e⁄ect is negative, and more than outweighs
the positive impact e⁄ect of the increase in natural resource endowments.
Also this result can be given a graphical representation. In Figure 4
with ￿ = 1 an increased amount of natural resources shifts the income curve
for political entrepreneurs up with the distance gr=l which represents the
impact e⁄ect. However as seen from the ￿gure aggregate income in the new
equilibrium is not only lower than what is the case after the impact e⁄ect,
it is also lower than in the initial equilibrium. As seen, the explanation
for this is the negative multiplier e⁄ect that the change in the allocation of
entrepreneurship sparks o⁄.11
11Note that if Assumption 2 does not hold then total income can not go down with more
natural resources, since then c is negative. Again, this can also easily be seen graphically
since in this case the curve for entrepreneurs in production is downward sloping and for
this reason more resources can not push total income down.
21Thus, the country with the weakest institutions and the lowest income
initially will ￿nd income further reduced with the discovery of new resources,
while the country with strongest institutions and highest income will expe-
rience increased income. For both reasons, the initial income di⁄erence is
magni￿ed with the discovery of new resources. Conditional on institutions,
similar new economic opportunities in di⁄erent countries may lead the coun-
tries to diverge.
2.4.3 Intermediate institutions











Thus the stronger constraints there are on political entrepreneurs the more of
the increase in natural resources is allocated to entrepreneurs in production
and the less to political entrepreneurs.










































De￿ning the resource curse as a situation where dY=dr < 0, we can then ￿nd
a critical level of the quality of institutions which we denote by ￿
￿, where
if ￿ < ￿
￿ more resources are a curse while if ￿ > ￿
￿ more resources are a
blessing. Inserting dY=dr = 0 in (10) we can implicitly de￿ne a critical level































22We see that (10) implicitly de￿nes a ￿
￿ 2 (0;1).12
Thus if ￿ > ￿
￿ there is a resource curse while if ￿ < ￿
￿ there is not a
resource curse.
2.5 Productive Politicians
In this subsection we extend our basic framework to allow those engaged in
politics to also take socially e¢ cient actions. In such a case more politicians
also have positive e⁄ects on the income of productive entrepreneurs. Thus
now let income per entrepreneur in the production sector be given by
y = f(l;r
p(￿;l)) + ￿(1 ￿ l); (12)
where ￿ > 0 represents the income gain for a productive entrepreneur from
an additional politician. To see how this a⁄ects the model assume to save
notation that we are in the case where ￿ = 0 so that all natural resources
accrue to the politicians.
Then inserting from (12) and (2) in (4), by di⁄erentiating we ￿nd the
































￿ is implicitly de￿ned in (11) since the right hand side of the equation is also depen-
dent on ￿. However a ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) that solves (11) will always exist. To see this note that
if ￿ = 0 then the left hand side of (11) is smaller than the right hand side of (11), while
if ￿ = 1 the left hand side of (11) is larger than the right hand side. Thus since both the
left and right hand sides of (11) are continous in ￿, by the Intermediate Value Theorem
there must exist a ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) that solves (11). In the continuation we assume that the ￿
￿
that solves (11) is unique.






















Thus when politicians also take socially e¢ cient actions income will increase






which can be seen to be equivalent to
￿ > fl:
Thus when the socially e¢ cient actions of the politicians are su¢ cient to
outweigh the socially destructive actions through transferring income to the
political elite, more resources increases income. If the opposite is the case, we
have a resource curse also when politicians provide socially bene￿cial services.
2.6 Entry Barriers
In our baseline model there is free entry into any profession. In this subsection
we investigate the results in our model when there are entry barriers. We
investigate this in a simple way by assuming that entrepreneurs who switch
profession have to incur a cost, and the stronger are entry barriers the higher
is this cost.
Consider ￿rst the case with strong political constraints, ￿ = 1. It is
straightforward to see that when it is costly to switch from politics to pro-
duction the upward shift in the curve for producers in Figure 3 is smaller,
resulting in a smaller increase in income from more natural resources. Thus
when institutions are strong entry barriers are costly from the point of view
of society.
Consider next the case of institutions without political constraints, ￿ = 0.
In this case the upward shift in the curve for politicians in Figure 4 is smaller,
resulting in a weaker resource curse than what would otherwise have been
24the case. Thus when institutional constraints are weak then entry barriers
(into politics) are conducive to prosperity.
Finally consider the case where entry barriers are so strong that entre-
preneurs never switch activity. In such a case we can never have a resource
curse as the income response to more resources is given by
dY
dr
= fr￿ + gr(1 ￿ ￿) > 0;
i.e. the income e⁄ect of natural resources is simply the aggregate of the mar-
ginal productivities. Thus in our model the view that the mapping from fac-
tor endowments to aggregate income and development is covered by adding
up the income responses found in microeconomic estimates only holds when
entry barriers are excessive.
2.7 Endogenous institutions
Admittedly, we have interpreted institutional strength in a very simple man-
ner, where we have just assumed that in countries with strong institutions
increased resource endowments are channeled into the productive sector while
in countries with weak institutions they are not. Even with this simple as-
sumption, however, we get stark results. Taking mechanisms related to in-
stitutions being endogenous to resources, we believe would strengthen our
results further. Thus consider the case claimed by some researchers that
institutional strength is not exogenous but endogenous to resource endow-
ments.13 If this is the case, it is reasonable to assume that it is easier to
tear down weak institutions than strong institutions. Then the di⁄erence in
economic outcomes may clearly be stronger than in the simple model above.
When institutions are weak in the ￿rst place then more natural resources
not only push aggregate income down through the e⁄ect studied above, but
the increased resources weaken institutions further, magnifying the negative
e⁄ects. Then the di⁄erence in aggregate income conditional on institutions
is even stronger than our simple model predicts.
Moreover, some researchers, e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a),
argue that when initial institutions are strong then new economic opportu-
13There is a very large literature on this going back to the notion of the ￿ rentier state￿
￿rst proposed by Mahdavy (1970).
25nities are likely to politically strengthen the merchant groups relative to the
political elite, in turn making the constraints on the political elite, and by
implication growth, even stronger. In our model such an e⁄ect could eas-
ily be incorporated by having ￿ = ￿(l) with ￿l(l) > 0. Incorporating this
would induce an institutional multiplier, where when initial institutions were
strong new economic opportunities would make them stronger, while where
initial institutions were weak new economic opportunities would make them
weaker.
2.8 Implications for empirical strategy
Although very simple, the above analysis indicates that the mapping from re-
source endowments, or more generally economic opportunities of many forms,
to income should not be studied independently of institutions. Moreover, the
interaction of institutional quality and resource endowments and opportuni-
ties is the crucial thing. Failing to condition the e⁄ect of resource abundance
on the quality on institutions means that one estimates the average e⁄ect
of oil in Norway and Nigeria, which may not be very interesting nor rele-
vant. Although obvious, this point often seems to be overlooked in empirical
analysis. One example of this is the much celebrated Sachs and Warner
(1995) paper, who in a cross section of countries looks at the average e⁄ect
of resource abundance. Moreover, according to these authors since there is
no strong e⁄ect from resource abundance on bureaucratic e¢ ciency (their
measure of institutional quality) they conclude that the negative e⁄ect of
resource abundance on growth (p. 19) ￿does not appear to work through
the bureaucracy e⁄ect￿(bold in original). However, as clari￿ed by the model
above and as discussed by Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006), failing to
￿nd that institutions is endogenous to resources is something di⁄erent than
claiming that the resource curse does not operate through institutional qual-
ity. Indeed, as we have discussed, there is reason to believe that a number
of cases where divergence in the mapping from economic opportunities to
aggregate income is observed, can be explained by countries having di⁄er-
ent institutions. This is so even if institutions are not endogenous to factor
endowments, as illustrated in the simple model above.
263 Historical episodes and empirical results
In addition to the impact of natural resources and frontier lands, there are a
number of other historical examples and empirical results that indicate that
the mapping from factor endowments or economic opportunities to aggregate
income and development is not simply covered by adding up the income
responses found in microeconomic estimates. The general equilibrium e⁄ects
are likely to be conditional on the nature of institutions.
3.1 The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism
What caused the transition to capitalist away from the feudal world? This
is a question which has attracted the attention of scholars for many genera-
tions and much of the historical debate anticipates the notion of conditional
comparative statics (see Hatcher and Bailey, 2001, for an overview of the
debate). For example, Pirenne (1937) argued that the decline of feudal insti-
tutions such as serfdom was due to the spread of market exchange and the
money economy. Yet Postan (1937, 1944) quickly pointed out that the most
dramatic fall in feudalism occurred after the Black Death when trade and
markets contracted. He also noted that expanding trade in the late medieval
period also did not necessary lead to declining serfdom. For instance the
expansion of the Baltic wheat trade came along with intensi￿ed serfdom in
the supplying areas of the eastern Baltic. Though Pirenne could point to
examples where expanding trade and marketization had led to better insti-
tutions and economic growth, Postan could point to other examples with the
opposite conclusion.
Postan himself then proposed an alternative explanation for the emer-
gence of capitalism - the demographic collapse of the Black Death. He argued
that is was the collapse of the European population in the 1340s, by possi-
bly 40-50%, which led to the end of serfdom by dramatically increasing the
bargaining power of labor (an argument picked up by North and Thomas,
1973). Yet as Brenner (1976) observed, while demographic collapse may
have led to better institutions in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe it went
along with worse institutions and the so-called ￿ Second Serfdom￿ . Although
27demographic trends were similar all over Europe14 and
￿it is true that ... in most of Western Europe serfdom was dead
by the early sixteenth century. On the other hand, in Eastern
Europe, in particular Pomerania, Brandenburg, East Prussia and
Poland, decline in population from the late fourteenth century
was accompanied by an ultimately successful movement towards
imposing extra-economic controls, that is serfdom, over what had
been, until then, one of Europe￿ s freest peasantries. By 1500 the
same Europe-wide trends had gone a long way towards establish-
ing one of the great divides in European history, the emergence of
an almost totally free peasant population in Western Europe, the
debasement of the peasantry to unfreedom in Eastern Europe.￿
(Brenner, 1976, p. 41).
What can explain these divergent outcomes? Brenner notes (p. 51): ￿It
was the logic of the peasant to try to use his apparently improved bargaining
position to get his freedom. It was the logic of the landlord to protect his
position by reducing the peasants￿freedom.￿The outcome ￿obviously came
down to a question of power￿(p. 51); whether the peasants or the lords
had more political power determined whether serfdom declined or became
stronger.
Although we are far from an understanding of the determinants of the
relative structure of political power in di⁄erent parts of Europe, Brenner
suggests that an important element was the ￿patterns of the development
of the contending agrarian classes and their relative strength in the dif-
ferent European societies: their relative levels of internal solidarity, their
self-consciousness and organization, and their general political resources￿
especially their relationships to the non-agricultural classes (in particular,
potential urban class allies) and to the state￿(p. 52). To substantiate this
view, Brenner studies how villages tended to be organized di⁄erently in East-
ern Europe, there was ￿more of a tendency to individualistic farming; less
developed organization of collaborative agricultural practices at the level of
14This is the current conventional wisdom amongst historical demographers, see Bene-
dictow (2004).
28the village or between villages; and little of the tradition of the ￿ struggle
for commons rights￿against the lords which was so characteristic of western
development￿(p. 57). This di⁄erential organization was due to the process
of initial occupation of these Eastern lands.
In other words the impact of the Black Death was conditional on the
initial institutional equilibrium.
3.2 Economic Growth in Early Modern Europe
Modern economic growth began with the British industrial revolution which
started around 1750. But Britain began to grow economically before this.
Indeed, both it and the Netherlands began to experience sustained if slow
economic growth from at least the mid 17th century onwards. This was
closely linked to the new trade and colonial opportunities represented by the
Americas and the expansion of demand for new products such as sugarcane
and tobacco. These new economic opportunities and the Atlantic economy
which developed from them has long been seen as central to the economic
success of pre-industrial Europe which itself has been seen as essential for the
industrial revolution (Allen, 2008, for the latter argument). Many arguments
have been made about the mechanism via which trade may have mattered
(Morgan, 2001, for a survey). It could have been though the pro￿ts of the
slave trade (Williams, 1944), or it could have been that slave plantations were
good markets for exports of manufactured goods or that the natural resource
endowments of the Americas relaxed constraints in Europe (Pomeranz, 2000).
Yet the Americas represented a new economic opportunity and potential
resource boom for all European countries. Indeed, the British and the Dutch
were latecomers in the race, the Spanish and Portuguese already having had
large American empires for over a century before either country began to
expand economically. So the Americas potentially bene￿tted all European
powers, but growth only happened in some. In fact Spain actually declined
economically during the early modern Period (`varez-Nogal and Prados De
La Escosura, 2007).
An interpretation of these facts is proposed in Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson (2005a). They show that while economic growth in early modern
Europe is on average positively correlated with involvement in Atlantic trade
29and colonial activities, the e⁄ects are heterogeneous. In particular when one
examines the conditional relationship between initial institutions, measured
by constraints in the executive in 1500, one ￿nds that the positive e⁄ect
of Atlantic trade comes in countries which initially had strong institutions
(relatively high levels of constraints on the executive15), such as Britain and
the Netherlands. For those with weak initial institutions (low constraints on
the executive), such as Spain or France, there is no such e⁄ect. This is again
an example of institutional comparative statics.
3.3 The First Wave of Globalization
The British industrial revolution and those that followed it created a wave
of globalization in the late nineteenth century (O￿ Rourke and Williamson,
1999). For many commodity exporting countries, such as those in the Amer-
icas, this created a huge improvement in their terms of trade. However, the
e⁄ects of this boom were very di⁄erent in di⁄erent contexts. In the United
States the traditional historiography sees these movements in relative prices
and trade patterns as promoting the development of the country, for instance
the expansion of Chicago as the hub for Midwestern farming exports. Yet
the Latin American story is quite di⁄erent. Though in most countries global-
ization did indeed lead to economic growth the impact of this on inequality,
real wages, average living standards and institutions was quite di⁄erent. In
fact in many places a dynamic akin to the Second Serfdom of Eastern Europe
emerged (Nugent and Robinson, 2010).
A salient example is what happened in Guatemala. As the world price
of co⁄ee rose and international trade expanded, there were huge pro￿ts to
be made. In 1871, the long-lasting regime of the dictator Rafael Carrera
was ￿nally overthrown by a group of people calling themselves ￿ Liberals,￿
after the worldwide movement of that name. Led initially by Miguel Garcia
Grenados, and after 1873 by Justo Ru￿no Barrios, the Guatemalan Liberals
implemented a huge re-organization of the economy to exploit co⁄ee. Co⁄ee
production needed two things, land and labor. To create land for co⁄ee
farms, the Liberals pushed through land privatization, a ￿ land grab￿in which
they would be able to capture land previously held communally or by the
15As constructed by the authors using the de￿nition of the Poliy dataset.
30government. Between 1871 and 1883, nearly 1 million acres of land, mostly
indigenous communal land and frontier lands, passed into the hands of the
elite, and it was only then that co⁄ee developed rapidly. The privatized lands
were auctioned o⁄ typically to members of the oligarchy or those connected
with them. The coercive power of the state was then used to help large
landowners gain access to labor. To do this, they adapted and intensi￿ed
various systems of forced labor. In November 1876, President Barrios wrote
to all the governors of Guatemala noting that
￿Because the country has extensive areas of land that it needs
to exploit by cultivation using the multitude of workers who to-
day remain outside the movement of development of the nation￿ s
productive elements, you are to give all help to export agriculture:
1. From the Indian towns of your jurisdiction provide to the
owners of ￿ncas [farms] of that department who ask for labor
the number of workers they need, be it ￿fty or one hundred￿
(McCreery, 1994, pp. 187-188).
The repartimiento, the forced labor draft, had never been abolished after
independence, but now it was increased in scope and duration. It was in-
stitutionalized by Decree 177 in 1877, which speci￿ed that employers could
request and receive from the government up to 60 workers for ￿fteen days
of work if the property was in the same department, and for thirty days
if it was outside it. The request could be renewed if the employer wanted
to. These workers could be forcibly recruited unless they could demonstrate
from their personal workbook that such service had recently been performed
satisfactorily. All rural workers were also forced to carry a workbook, called
a ￿ libreta,￿which included details of who they were working for and a record
of any debts. Many rural workers were indebted to their employers and an
indebted worker could not leave his current employer without permission.
Decree 177 further stipulated that the only way to avoid being drafted into
the repartimiento was to show you were currently in debt to an employer.
Workers were trapped. In addition to these laws, numerous vagrancy laws
were passed so that anyone who could not prove he had a job would be im-
mediately recruited for the repartimiento or other types of forced labor on
31the roads, or would be forced to accept employment on a farm. As in 19th
and 20th century South Africa, land policies after 1871 were also designed to
undermine the subsistence economy of the indigenous peoples, to force them
to work for low wages. David McCreery (1976, 1994) a historian of rural
Guatemala, argues that
￿taking away or reducing the land belonging to Indians was an
e⁄ective way of creating a low wage labor force ... In the 1870s and
1880s insu¢ cient cheap labor was a ... barrier to the expansion
of co⁄ee. The incorporation into the latifundia of Indian village
lands ... helped to create rural unemployment by forcing families
into marginal areas or leaving them without access to su¢ cient
land. Such conditions were precisely those prerequisites to the
laws of vagrancy and debt servitude favored by the Liberals for
mobilizing the cheap labor.￿
The repartimiento lasted until the 1920s; the libreta system and the full
gamut of vagrancy laws were in e⁄ect until 1945 when Guatemala experienced
its ￿rst brief ￿ owering of democracy.
The pattern exhibited in Guatemala happened elsewhere, in Bolivia and
Peru and Mexico. Indeed, Coatsworth (1974) showed that in Mexico the
expansion of the railway system was correlated with uprisings and rebellions
caused by the expropriation of the lands made more valuable by improved
infrastructure. We have no real evidence on living standards outside of Mex-
ico but the evidence there suggests that during the long economic expansion
which took place under the dictator Por￿rio Diaz between 1878 and 1910 real
wages fell (G￿mez-Galvariatto, 1998) as did the stature of military recruits
(L￿pez-Alonso, 2007).
The impact of globalization on nineteenth century Americas is another
example of conditional comparative statics. Where institutions were initially
strong, as in the United States, globalization promoted economic growth,
improved institutions and living standards. Where institutions were initially
weak, as in much of Latin America, although globalization did go along with
increased income per-capita it also led to massive inequality, institutional
deterioration and falling average wages. It is also worth noting that the
economic growth of the ￿ Pro￿riato￿was followed by the Mexican Revolution.
32Perhaps the most devastating example of this phenomenon is the impact
on West Africa of the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 (see Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2010, 2011, and the essays in Law ed. 1995). In the place of the
slave trade came ￿ legitimate commerce,￿a phrase coined for the export from
Africa of new commodities not tied to the slave trade. These goods included
palm oil and kernels, peanuts, ivory, rubber and gum arabic. The Industrial
Revolution in Europe created new commercial opportunities in Africa just as
they did in Latin America but they did so in a peculiar context where slavery
had become a way of life but the external demand for slaves had suddenly
dried up. Instead of selling the slaves to Europeans, many of them were
now pro￿tably put to work in Africa producing the new items of legitimate
commerce.
One of the best documented examples of this is in Asante in modern
Ghana (Austin, 2002, 2005). Prior to 1807, the Asante Empire had been
heavily involved in the capturing and export of slaves, bringing them down
to the coast to be sold at the great slaving castles of Cape Coast and Elmina.
After 1807, with this option closed o⁄, the Asante political elite re-organized
their economy. Slaving and slavery did not end. Rather slaves were settled
in large plantations, initially around the capital city of Kumase, but later
spread throughout the empire (corresponding to most of modern interior
Ghana). They were employed in the production of gold and kola nuts for
exports, but also grew large quantities of food and were intensively used as
porters since Asante did not use wheeled transportation. Further east similar
adaptations took place. In Dahomey, for example, the King had large palm
oil plantations near the coastal ports of Whydah and Porto Novo, all based
on slave labor.
Even if the trade outside of Africa ￿nished, that did not alter many of the
political institutions it had wrought in the previous two centuries and did not
restore incentives to produce and invest in these societies. As a result of these
developments, rather than contracting, the extent of slavery appears to have
expanded in Africa throughout the 19th century. Though accurate ￿gures
are hard to come by, a number of existing accounts written by travellers
and merchants during this time suggest that in the West African kingdoms
of Asante or Dahomey and in the Yoruba city states well over half of the
33population were slaves (Lovejoy, 2000, p. 174). More accurate data exist
from early French colonial records for the Western Sudan, a large swathe of
Western Africa stretching from Senegal, via Mali and Burkina Faso, to Niger
and Chad. In this region 30 percent of the population were slaves in 1900
(see Lovejoy, 2000, p. 192).
Here we see another example of a potential positive shock, in the form of
expanding markets for tropical products and reduced transportation crops
ending up with very adverse e⁄ects on African societies because of the way
they interacted with the initial institutional equilibrium.
3.4 Foreign Aid
Finally, we note that the literature on the impact of foreign aid on economic
growth also has very similar ￿ndings. Burnside and Dollar (2000), for ex-
ample, ￿nds that in countries with bad economic policies foreign aid has no
impact on economic growth growth. However, when policies are good foreign
aid and growth are positively correlated.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have developed the idea that economists have been too
ambitious in trying to develop simple models of the comparative static e⁄ects
of resource endowments and new economic opportunities. Even political
scientists are tempted. For example, the debate in economics on the impact
of natural resources on economic growth is closely mirrored by one in political
science about the impact on democracy. Some claim natural resources cause
authoritarianism (Ross, 2001), some that is causes democracy (Karl, 1997),
others that it has no impact on either (Haber and Menaldo, 2011). All look
for average e⁄ects. Yet Luong and Weinthal (2010) present a conditional
resource curse where the impact of resources, particularly oil, is conditional
on ownership structure. For instance, state ownership is associated with a
resource curse. They argue that the form of ownership structure depends
on the availability of di⁄erent ￿scal possibilities and the nature of political
con￿ ict in society. This is an argument closely related to the one in this
34paper.16
Though trying to show that natural resources creates booms or democ-
racy, or the opposite, might be sharp and appealing, even basic microeco-
nomic theory suggests that there would be conditional and heterogeneous
e⁄ects. Such e⁄ects might have nothing to do with institutions, in the same
way that the standard comparative static results of international trade theory
are conditional on factor intensities. However, in this paper we have argued
that in many well studied cases it is the nature of institutions which deter-
mines the comparative statics of an equilibrium. This emphasis is natural
given the existing consensus about the dominant role institutional di⁄erences
play in determining comparative patterns of economic development.
Of course there are many institutions which might be relevant and which
are relevant may itself depend on the context. Following a great deal of re-
search we have emphasized the strength or weakness of institutions which
place checks and balances or constraints on political leaders. The argument
that these are crucial for a well functioning society was clearly recognized by
the formulators of the constitution of the Roman Republic, received articu-
late modern treatments from Montesquieu and James Madison in the 18th
century and has been central to the work of Douglass North and his collabo-
rators. It is also central to many of the empirical studies which inspired this
paper. We developed a simple model to illustrate how comparative statics
may be conditional on the strength of institutions and emphasized how this
can help to reconcile many historical and empirical studies. The model was
extremely reduced from and based on the allocation of talent in society and in
particular the allocation between productive and non-productive activities,
which we associated with ￿ politics￿ . Although simple, we believe the theoret-
ical approach brings with it a number of insights which has implications for
empirical design, the understanding of economic history, as well as the gen-
eral question of how resource endowments and new economic opportunities
map into aggregate incomes.
16Dunning (2008) injected an early piece of nuance into this literature by developing a
theoretical model where there are di⁄erent mechanisms linking oil wealth to democracy
the strength of which is conditional on inequality.
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